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Barriers Inhibiting Industry from Partnering with Universities: 







A small sample of 38 Advanced Technology Projects funded between 1993 and 1996 are 
surveyed to explore the reasons for university non-participation, or, in the cases where they 
did participate, whether the partnerships encountered any difficulties from their participation. 
32 percent report that intellectual property issues were an insurmountable barrier to university 
participation. Such barriers are more likely when the ATP share of funding is high and when 
the expected duration of the research is relatively short. They are also somewhat more likely 
for projects involving chemical technology, and when industrial participants have had 
previous experience with universities as research partners. These difficulties over IP may 
arise because the cultures in the two institutional forms differ, or because the original ATP 
guidelines do not recognize the existence of the Bayh-Dole Act (which grants universities 





Keywords:  University-industry partnership, intellectual property, patents, research joint 
venture, Advanced Technology Program, RJV, ATP, IPR 





Barriers Inhibiting Industry from Partnering with Universities: 
Evidence from the Advanced Technology Program 
 





  There is a long and well-documented history of industry/university research 
relationships. In Europe, such relationships can be traced at least to the mid- to late-1800s 
and in the United States to at least the industrial revolution. Hounshell (1996) and Rosenberg 
and Nelson (1994) provide excellent historical overviews of the evolution of these 
associations.  In recent decades, the nature of such relationships has become more formal 
through the formation of explicit research joint ventures and partnerships. 
  It is generally accepted, at least in the United States, that research partnerships are a 
critical strategic response to global competition.
1 The Council on Competitiveness (1996) in 
its recent policy statement, Endless Frontiers, Limited Resources: U.S. R&D Policy for 
Competitiveness, took the position that (1996, pp. 3-4), “R&D partnerships hold the key to 
meeting the challenge of transition that our nation now faces” and industry will increasingly 
rely on universities to ensure the success of the research being undertaken. Relatedly, 
Mowery (1998, p. 646), commenting on structural changes in the U.S. innovation system, 
noted that a major element of structural change is “increased reliance by U.S. firms on 
sources of R&D outside their organizational boundaries, through such mechanisms as … 
collaboration with U.S. universities….” 
  In the United States, the number of new, formal research joint ventures (RJVs) 
formed under the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 and its amendment 
                                                 
1 For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on research partnerships, see Hagedoorn, 




the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) of 1993 has been cyclical, 
reaching a peak in 1995, falling for three years, and just now beginning to increase again 
(Brod and Link forthcoming).  However, the percentage of RJVs involving at least one 
university as a research partner has generally increased since 1985, as illustrated in Figure 
1.
2,3 
The trend showing an increase in RJVs with university partners is not surprising given 
the claim by the Council on Competitiveness that university presence helps to ensure the 
partnership’s research success. Rosenberg and Nelson (1994, p. 340) make a similar claim, 
“What university research most often does today is to stimulate and enhance the power of 
R&D done in industry.” Hall, Link, and Scott (2000, p. 19) conclude from their project-based 
study of universities as research partners that universities create research awareness among 
the research partners of the joint venture: 
 
Universities are included (e.g., invited by industry) in those research projects 
that involve what we have called “new” science. As such, it is the collective 
perception of the other research participant(s) that the university could provide 
a research insight that is more anticipatory of future research problems that 
might be encountered and could thus take on the role of an ombudsman to 
anticipate and translate to all concerned the complex nature of the research 
being undertaken. Thus, one finds universities purposively involved in 
projects that are characterized as problematic with regard to the use of basic 
knowledge. 
 
  Given the research productivity-enhancing effects of such partnerships, the trend in 
Figure 1 may well continue and perhaps even intensify. However, there is another issue 
implicit in Figure 1, and that issue serves to motivate this paper. Whereas universities are 
                                                 
2 Of the 741 RJVs filed by the end of 1998, 111 had at least one university involved as a research 
partner.  In addition, the average number of university members as a share of the total number of 
members in an RJV has steadily increased over time. 
3 The estimated slope coefficient from a linear regression on time of the percentage of RJVs with at 
least one university partner is positive and significant.  These results and those from other 




research partners in about 15 percent of all RJVs—at least all RJVs that are registered under 
the NCRA and NCRPA and made public in the Federal Register—the vast majority of 
research partnerships do not involve a university. Was university research participation in 
these projects simply not warranted because of the nature of the research? Or, was a research 
relationship with a university sought, but institutional barriers inhibited or even prevented the 
research partnership from coming about?
4  
  In Section II we describe a small, unique set of project data that was assembled as part 
of a larger study on universities as research partners in projects funded by the Advanced 
Technology Program (Hall, Link, and Scott 2000). In Section III, we summarize, to the extent 
possible, our interpretation of what the project data reveal about barriers, intellectual property 
(IP) concerns in particular, inhibiting industry from partnering with universities. Finally, in 
Section IV we offer some policy observations in light of our findings.  
 
II. The Advanced Technology Program and the Program’s Project Data 
  The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) not only 
changed the name of the National Bureau of Standards to the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and broadened its scope of responsibility, but also it facilitated the 
ability of Congress to enact a so-called direct competitiveness program, the Advanced 
Technology Program (ATP). The American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-
245) later clarified the mission of the ATP.  
                                                 
4 We realize that this is not a new question. The National Science Foundation hosted a one-day 
Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in 1981. “The purpose of the workshop was to find out 
whether intellectual property issues were inhibiting cooperative research and, if so, how” (National 
Science Board 1981, p. 275). The Office of the General Counsel concluded that patents are not always 




  The stated goals of the ATP are to assist U.S. business in creating and applying the 
generic technology and research results necessary to: 
 
(1)    commercialize significant new scientific discoveries and technologies 
rapidly; and  
(2)  refine manufacturing technologies. 
 
The ATP was also designed to enhance the competitiveness of industry. The enabling 
legislation is explicit about that objective:  
 
The ATP … will assist U.S. businesses to improve their competitive position 
and promote U.S. economic growth by accelerating the development of a 
variety of pre-competitive generic technologies by means of grants and 
cooperative agreements. 
 
  Towards this goal, ATP was mandated to enhance competitiveness by underwriting 
selected research projects. Thus by design, the ATP represents a program for direct funding 
of private-sector research through public-sector financial resources.
5 The first ATP awards 
were made in April 1991. 
  For this study, 38 projects funded by the ATP between 1993 and 1996 were 
considered.
6 This group of projects was randomly selected from the population of all 
completed ATP projects during that time period that were either single participant projects or 
one of four categories of joint venture research projects: without a university as a research 
partner, with a university(ies) as a research partner, with a university(ies) as a subcontractor, 
with a university(ies) as a research partner and a university(ies) as a subcontractor.  
                                                 
5 See Link and Scott (forthcoming) for an economic rationale for the ATP as a direct funding 
program. See also Link (1999) for a discussion of the ATP within the broader context of 
public/private partnerships in the United States. 




  A complete description of the sample selection process is in Hall, Link, and Scott 
(2000). The sample in that paper included not only the 38 projects used here, but also 9 
single-participant projects with a university(ies) as a subcontractor. Information about IP 
barriers was not available for those projects; hence, they could not be used in the present 
study. 
With the assistance of the ATP, information was collected about the members of each 
research project and the project’s funding characteristics. Also, the lead participant in each 
project was identified; that participant was contacted in advance about the nature of the study, 
asked to respond to a brief survey instrument, and assured that individual responses would 
remain anonymous.  
  We are sensitive not only about the smallness of this sample but also about the fact 
that the ATP-funded research projects are not necessarily representative of the population of 
all research undertakings, whether they be collaborative or not. Accordingly, we emphasize 
up front that the patterns in our project data as well as our conclusions should be interpreted 
(and generalized) with the utmost caution. However, to date, there is a void of research that 
has attempted to identify systematically barriers that inhibit industry from participating with 
universities in research projects, ATP-funded or otherwise.
7 Thus this research is exploratory 
in its nature, sample size issues aside, and should be interpreted as such. 
 
III. Analysis of the Survey Data 
  The focus of this study is to investigate whether there are identifiable barriers—
intellectual property rights related barriers in particular—that inhibit firms from partnering in 




common in particular types of research projects. The issue of intellectual property vis-à-vis 
the relationship between firms and universities has precedence in the literature. According to 




Since university research is often portrayed as a public good (e.g., 
characterized by free circulation), the spread of IPR [intellectual property 
rights] protection into university R&D activities has attracted considerable 
attention. Where once industry benefited from exchange systems with 
academia based upon transactions such as informal barter relationships, those 
in industry now find universities seeking contractual, exchange-value-based 
relationships. 
 
Brainard (1999, p. 9), is more explicit about the differing objectives of industry and 
universities regarding intellectual property. And, it is these conflicting objectives that cause 
potential research relationships to fail, or perhaps never to begin in the first place: 
 
The goal of business and universities in producing and protecting intellectual 
property is innovation for the production of revenue. Beyond this ultimate 
shared goal, the interests of universities and businesses diverge. Universities 
value intellectual property not only as a revenue-producing resource, but also 
as a tool in the advancement and dissemination of knowledge. These divergent 
interests can result in conflicts…. 
 




[W]e might expect particular tensions to arise in settings where the 
conventions of one world (private industry) come up against the conventions 
of another (public R&D and university science).  
                                                                                                                                                        
7 See Cohen, Florida, and Randazzese (forthcoming) for a discussion of intellectual property 
protection mechanisms that successfully facilitate industry-university collaboration. 
8 These authors go on to say, as emphasis for understanding the environment associated with the 
imposition of IPRs, “[w]hile the “university-industry interface might be a key factor in promoting 
innovation, the complex and varied nature of that interface needs to be understood and explored” (p. 
875). 





Lead participants in the 38 projects studied were asked a variety of direct-response 
and open-ended questions from which we judged if intellectual property issues were an 
insurmountable barrier or a significant stumbling block with regard to a university being 
included as a research partner in the project.
10 Thirty-two percent of the survey respondents 
noted that IP issues were indeed an insurmountable barrier. Representative remarks from lead 
participants, in projects without university involvement, who reported that IP barriers 
prevented the partnership with a university are:
11 
 
In general, companies such as ours believe that we own the intellectual 
property developed for us under sponsored research. This view is often not 
shared by potential university partners. 
 
IP is often a stumbling block for collaborations because many universities 
want to publish results prior to IP protection, and sometimes will not grant 
exclusivity of results. 
 
In general, the difficulties that usually prevent a successful partnership [with a 
university] are (1) intellectual property issues and (2) the university partner’s 
lack of understanding of our business. 
 
  Some projects, in which intellectual property issues prevented a university from being 
a research partner, were nevertheless able to use a university as a subcontractor.
12 
Observations from lead participants in such projects are: 
 
                                                 
10 The survey questionnaires are available from the authors. Each project has a designated lead 
participant for reporting purposes to the ATP. 
11 Siegel, Waldman, and Link (1999) report that the most significant barrier to industry/university 
technology transfer is a lack of understanding (on the part of firms and universities) regarding 
corporate, university, and scientific norms and environments. 
12 Our data are not rich enough for us to determine if the firm first tried to include the university as a 





Universities feel that if their brainpower and equipment were used to develop 
a new technology then they should benefit financially as an industrial partner 
would. However, to do so they should be prepared to take an equity position in 
any commercial ventures derived from the technical work. 
 
University licensing offices have an overinflated view of the value they bring 
to the project. [They have] unrealistic licensing expectations [and] an 
overinflated view of the value of intellectual property. 
 
  We assembled data on several characteristics of each of the 38 ATP-funded projects 
in the sample. In particular, we know the total budget of each project; the amount of the total 
budget that is funded by the ATP and hence the percentage of each project that was ATP-
funded; the proposed length or duration of each project; the size of the lead participant;
13 the 
organizational structure of the awardee (single participant, joint venture with no university 
involvement, joint venture with a university as a subcontractor, joint venture with a university 
as a research partner, joint venture with a university as a subcontractor and as a research 
partner); if the lead participant has previously been involved with a university as a research 
partner; and the technology class that characterizes the research of the project. More 
specifically, for the analysis that follows we define the following variables: 
IPbar is a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the lead participant in the project 
reported that there were intellectual property rights issues that created insurmountable 
barriers thus preventing a university from being a research partner in the project, and 
0 otherwise;
14 
                                                 
13 Lead participants are classified by the ATP as being a small firm (less than 500 employees), a large 
firm (defined as a Fortune 500 or equivalent organization), a medium-sized firm (defined as not small 
or large), or a non-profit organization (such as a trade association).  
14 IPbar=0 should be interpreted to mean that the research firm did not face any insurmountable IP 
barriers when including a university as a research partner, did face issues but overcame them, or did 
not require a university as a research partner in the project. IPbar=1 should be interpreted to mean 
that a university was sought to be a research partner, but the relationship could not be finalized 




total is the total cost, including the ATP award for the research project, measured in 
thousands of dollars.  
atppct is the percentage of total project cost funded by the ATP;
15  
length equals the length of the research project in years;
16 
small equals 1 if the lead participant is a small-sized firm, and 0 otherwise;  
medium equals 1 if the lead participant is a medium-sized firm, and 0 otherwise; 
large equals 1 if the lead participant is a large-sized firm, and 0 otherwise; 
nonprof equals 1 if the lead participant is a non-profit organization, and 0 otherwise; 
s equals 1 if the awardee is a single participant, and 0 otherwise; 
jv equals 1 if the awardee is a joint venture with no university involvement, and 0 
otherwise; 
jvs equals 1 if the awardee is a joint venture with a university as a subcontractor, and 
0 otherwise; 
jvu equals 1 if the awardee is a joint venture with a university as a research partner, 
and 0 otherwise; 
jvus equals 1 if the awardee is a joint venture with a university as a subcontractor and 
as a research partner, and 0 otherwise; 
prevuniv equals 1 if the lead participant has previously been involved with a 
university as a research partner, and 0 otherwise.
17 
All of the above information, except for IPbar and prevuniv came from the ATP; 
information about IPbar and prevuniv came from the surveys. 
                                                 
15 By statute, ATP’s maximum contribution to a single applicant project is $2 million. For joint 
ventures of any organizational structure, ATP cannot fund over 50 percent of direct costs. 
16 There is a three-year statutory limit on single applicant projects and a five-year limit on joint 
venture projects. 
17 Previous involvement with a university as a research partner was defined on the survey as frequent, 




Descriptive statistics on each of these variables are in Tables 1 and 2. The sample of 
38 projects is divided into those for which the lead participant reported an insurmountable IP 
barrier (12 observations), and those for which IP issues were not so characterized (26 
observations). Of these 26, 13 were joint ventures with university(ies) as research partners 
(jvu and jvus). Not surprisingly, none of these joint ventures reported an insurmountable IP 
barrier to partnering (see Table 2).
18 Thus some of our subsequent analysis focuses only on 
the 25 observations for joint ventures without university partners (jv,  jvs) and for single 
participant projects (s), of which 12 reported insurmountable barriers. We show descriptive 
statistics for this sample of 25 observations in Table 1 also.  
We also found that all projects with a single participant who reported prior experience 
with a university partner reported that IP was an insurmountable barrier in partnering with 
universities. Thus s plus prevuniv is a perfect predictor. However, those without prior 
experience also occasionally encountered IP barriers, so we included all these projects in our 
estimating sample because they provide some information on the determinants of IP barriers. 
  Table 1 shows that the projects encountering IP problems tend to be smaller, shorter, 
and have a higher ATP share of the funding. Besides the fact that joint ventures with 
university partners and non-profit lead participants do not encounter insurmountable IP 
barriers, Table 2 shows that such barriers are enhanced, rather than diminished, by prior 
experience with a university. Among the three technology classes that are more highly 
represented—information technology, materials, and biotechnology—IP issues as an 
insurmountable barrier preventing universities being a research partner are not noticeably 
different.  
                                                 




  In an effort to understand more systematically when intellectual property issues are an 
insurmountable barrier preventing university participation as a research partner (not as a 
subcontractor), we considered the following exploratory model:
19 
 
(1)   Probability (insurmountable IP barrier) = F (atppct,  length,  prevuniv, 
chem,small,large) 
 
where each of the variables has been previously defined, with the exception of the dummy 
variable that classifies projects in chemicals technology (chem=1, and 0 otherwise). Equation 
(1) was estimated as a probit model using IPbar as the dependent variable and the estimates 
are shown in Table 3. We consider 3 samples of observations, all of which give the same 
general conclusions. Column (1) contains estimates for the whole sample, column (2) for the 
sample of observations excluding those with non-profit lead participants, and columns (3) 
and (4) for the sample of observations excluding joint ventures with university participants 
(jvu and jvus).  
   Our first finding is that the size of the lead participant does not help to predict the 
presence of insurmountable IP barriers (column (3)) in the presence of the other variables, so 
our preferred specification is that in columns (1), (2), and (4), all of which have similar 
findings. This last fact means that the results in column (1) are not simply because of the fact 
that joint ventures with university participants that have not encountered IP barriers or have 
overcome them (the group we excluded in columns (3) and (4)) are different in other ways 
from the rest of the sample. 
                                                 




Focusing now on column (4) in Table 3, we see that in spite of the small sample, the 
overall model is significant in predicting the probability of encountering IP barriers to 
partnering and that it has a pseudo R
2 of just over 60 percent. Difficulties in negotiating IP 
among the partners are associated positively with ATP’s share in the project, the lead 
participant’s prior experience with university partnering, and being a project in the chemicals 
industry, and negatively with the length of the project. We will discuss each of these factors 
in turn. 
First, as the percentage of project costs that is funded by the ATP increases, the 
probability that IP issues will create insurmountable barriers inhibiting a university from 
joining the project as a research partner also increases. The calculated partial derivative of the 
probability with respect to this variable is quite large—4.4. At the mean value of 54 percent, 
an increase in atppct of one standard deviation (10%) predicts that the probability of there 
being an insurmountable IP barrier increases by 0.44 or by 44 percent, albeit with a standard 
error of about 23 percent.
20  
 Our interpretation is that the ATP share in project funding is an instrument that is 
highly correlated with the expected inappropriability or publicness of the research results. 
The larger the percentage of a project that a firm is willing to fund, the more the firm expects 
to be able to appropriate an adequate portion of the research results from that project and 
hence the less public the nature of the results. Increases in ATP’s funding percentage, 
mirroring decreases in the firm’s funding percentage, thus reflect research results that are 
expected by the firm to be less appropriable or relatively more public in nature. At the same 
                                                 
20 The exact effect of any stated change in an explanatory variable can be computed by the interested 
reader by calculating the effect on the probit index. For that procedure, use the estimated probit 
coefficients, the means of the variables as shown in Table 1, and the stated settings for the explanatory 
variable in question. The computed index values can then be converted to the associated value of the 




time, these firms have been unable to reach an agreement with a university partner to do the 
research. As a result, it logically follows that as the percentage of funding from ATP 
increases the “two worlds” of R&D are increasingly in conflict, with the firm trying even 
harder to capture all intellectual property while the university is trying to make it public. 
Hence, IP issues become more noticeable and act as a barrier to the industry-university 
research partnership as ATP’s funding percentage increases.
21 Alternatively, it is possible that 
ATP funding is to a certain extent substituting for the university in the cases where 
negotiation between the potential partners broke down because of differences over IP rights. 
The second finding in column (4) of Table 3 is that IP barriers are greater the shorter 
the length of the project. Again, the partial effect is large. As project length increases from 
the mean of 3.17 years to 3.67 years (approximately six months), the estimated probability of 
there being an insurmountable IP barrier decreases by 11.5 percent, with a standard error of 
approximately 6 percent. 
Our interpretation is that the length of the project is highly correlated with the 
uncertainty of the research findings. The longer the expected duration of the research at the 
time the research is funded, the less certain the firm or the university will be as to the 
intellectual property characteristics of the research results. Hence, the longer the expected 
duration of the research project, the less likely it is that either party will face an 
insurmountable IP barrier because neither party is able to define meaningfully the boundaries 
of characteristics that the research results will have. Note that this does not rule out the 
possibility that unanticipated conflicts over IP rights may arise in the future, it is simply that 
IP barriers do not prevent the project from starting. 
                                                 




Our third finding is that lead participants that have been involved with universities as 
research partners in the past are, other factors held constant, relatively more likely to find IP 
issues with a university insurmountable. On average across the sample, changing prevuniv 
from 0 to 1 increases the predicted probability of insurmountable barriers by 0.9. Evidently, 
experience with universities as partners does not, given the currently available IP-protection 
mechanisms, allow resolution of IP issues. Instead, the experience appears to make industry 
aware of the insurmountable barriers that exist given current institutional arrangements for 
protecting intellectual property.
22  
Alternative specifications of equation (1) were examined (not reported here). In all 
cases, the only technology effect that was significant was that for projects in chemicals 
technology, thus the other technology class dummies were deleted. Other researchers have 
shown that patent protection is especially important to firms in the chemicals industry.
23 
Hence, the university would also find it financially attractive to have ownership rights in this 
technology area, and thus conflict arises. On average across the sample, projects involving 
chemicals technology have a probability of insurmountable IP barriers that is higher than the 
probability for the other technologies by 0.63. However, we remind the reader that there are 
only 3 chemical projects in our sample, so this result for the present sample is surely  a 
tentative one for samples in general. 
                                                 
22 As we have noted, there are institutional constraints on ATP’s share of total project funding and on 
project duration.  A careful reader might reasonably conclude that the strong effects for ATP’s share 
and project length simply reflect those institutional constraints for single-participant projects versus 
joint ventures.  However, that is not the case.  Adding the variable s, the qualitative variable for 
single-participant projects, to the preferred specification with 25 observations, and even accounting 
for the perfect predictions when single-participant projects have previous experience with universities, 
the partial derivative for each variable can be estimated.  The partial derivative for s is not significant, 
while the remaining partial derivatives tell essentially the same story as reported in Table 3.  The 
signs of the partials are the same, and their magnitude and level of significance are quite similar. 
23 See, for example, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) and particularly the references therein to Levin 




  As we discussed earlier, the best predictor of insurmountable IP barriers to partnering 
with a university was to be one of those projects that went ahead as a single participant 
project or as a joint venture without a university participant. Thus, the most important finding 
may be that there are projects funded by ATP where the participants may have desired 
university cooperation but found that they could not reach agreement on intellectual property 
issues. 
 
IV. Concluding Observations 
  We interpret our findings from this exploratory investigation on two levels. At one 
level, we have demonstrated that IP issues between firms and universities do exist, and in 
some cases those issues represent an insurmountable barrier which prevents the sought-after 
research partnership from ever coming about. Such situations have a greater likelihood of 
occurring when the research is expected to lead to less appropriable results that thus have a 
relatively greater degree of publicness and when the expected duration of the research is 
relatively short term and is thus more certain in terms of the characteristics of the research 
findings. 
  Table 4 summarizes these findings. It shows two panels, one for lead participants with 
no prior university partnering experience and one for those with prior experience. Across the 
top of the 2x2 matrix we segment the research as being either appropriable or inappropriable 
(where inappropriability is an increasing function of the percentage of the research cost that is 
funded by the ATP). Along the left of the matrix we segment the results as being either 
certain or uncertain (where uncertainly is an increasing function of the length of the research 
project). Within each cell of the matrix we have simulated the probability of there being 
insurmountable IP barriers using the probit estimates in column (4) for projects that are not in 




+/- one standard deviation from the mean of atppct, and uncertainty/certainty defined for 
purposes of these calculations as +/- one standard deviation from the mean of length.   
The simulated probabilities provide an interesting descriptive conclusion. First, the 
probabilities are much higher when the lead participant has prior experience partnering with a 
university, so that they are aware of the difficulties they may encounter. Second, the 
probability that insurmountable IP barriers will arise between a firm and a university in terms 
of partnering are greatest when the intellectual property characteristics of the research are 
certain and the ability of the firm to appropriate such results is least. Further, the probability 
of barriers is least when the IP is appropriable yet uncertain. The appropriability of the IP 
implies less publicness, and then less tension between the “two worlds.” Regarding the 
uncertainty, the evidence in our small sample supports the possibility that, other things being 
the same, when neither party can define meaningful boundaries for any resulting IP, IP is less 
likely to be an insurmountable issue, although we recognize that is not logically inevitable. 
The remaining probabilities in Table 4 show the intermediate cases where the two effects of 
publicness and of uncertainty are to an extent offsetting, although it is clear that 
appropriability (as measured by the ATP share) is a more important predictor than project 
length. 
  At a second and broader level, there is some policy relevance to our findings. From 
other investigations, there is evidence to conclude that ATP funding is overcoming a market 
failure; in the absence of such funding the research is not likely to have occurred.
24 However, 
as previously noted in the introduction, Hall, Link, and Scott (2000) have found that a 
university participating  in a research partnership can take on the important role of an 
ombudsman to anticipate and translate to all involved the complex nature of the research 
                                                 




being undertaken. Thus, in such desired situations, as we have shown here, there remains an 
element of government  failure. The government has not provided appropriate legal 
infrastructure. Firms and universities, in an effort to pursue their own research strategies in 
their separate worlds, are unable to partner because of limitations of the intellectual property 
protection mechanisms that are currently available.
25 
                                                 
25At one level, the presence of insurmountable IP issues implies that existing IP protection mechanisms are 
inadequate given the culture clash between industry and the universities.  At another, one might believe that the 
problem could be an insurmountable culture clash that mechanisms for IP protection could not ameliorate.  A 
look at the initial ATP guidelines shows that in fact government may have failed to provided appropriate IP 
protection to facilitate university-industry partnerships for ATP projects.  Technology transfer officers 
emphasize that a problem for universities was created by the original ATP guidelines because they required that 
any ATP project patents must be held by the non-university participants.  The original ATP guidelines did not 
recognize the Bayh-Dole Act under which universities are allowed to keep the title to the inventions conceived 









































Sample Descriptive Statistics  
           
   
All Projects (N=38) 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Median  1Q  3Q  Min  Max 
          
Project size ($1000)  10,794  8,533  7,486  3,935  15,544  1,987  39,070 
ATP share of funding  52.2%  8.0%  49.5%  49.0%  50.0%  43.7%  83.6% 
Length  (years)  3.5 1.2 3.0 3.0 5.0 1.5  5.0 
   
Projects Excluding JVs with University Partners (N=25) 
          
Project  size  ($1000)  8,912 7,575 6,481 3,312  11,909 1,987 31,309 
ATP share of funding  53.8%  9.5%  49.4%  49.0%  57.1%  43.7%  83.6% 
Length  (years)  3.2 1.1 3.0 2.0 4.0 1.5  5.0 
   
Projects with IP Barriers (N=12) 
          
Project  size  ($1000)  8,303 9,108 3,464 2,930  12,874 1,987 31,309 
ATP  share  of  funding  57.3% 10.3% 51.9% 50.0% 63.1% 49.0%  83.6% 







Sample Descriptive Statistics (Binary Variables) 
        
  All Projects (N=38)  Projects with IP Barriers 
(N=12) 
Projects with no IP 
Barriers (N=26) 
Variable  Mean  Number=1  Mean  Number=1  Mean  Number=1 
         
IP barriers? (IPbar) 0.316  12  1.000  12  0.000  0 
         
Small lead participant (small) 0.368  14  0.417  5  0.346  9 
Medium lead participant (medium) 0.132  5 0.167 2 0.115 3 
Large lead participant (large) 0.316  12  0.417  5  0.269  7 
Non-profit lead participant (nonprof) 0.184  7  0.000  0  0.269  7 
         
Single participant (s) 0.237  9  0.583  7  0.077  2 
Joint venture with no university (jv) 0.211  8  0.167  2  0.231  6 
Joint venture with university as 
subcontractor (jvs) 
0.211 8 0.250  3  0.192 5 
Joint venture with university as partner 
(jvu) 
0.211 8 0.000  0  0.308 8 
Joint venture with univ. as partner and 
subcontractor (jvus) 
0.132 5 0.000  0  0.192 5 
         














         
Info. and computer systems  0.237  9  0.250  3  0.231  6 
Materials 0.211  8  0.167  2  0.231  6 
Manufacturing 0.132  5  0.000  0  0.192  5 
Electronics 0.079  3  0.167  2  0.038  1 
Energy and environment  0.026  1  0.000  0  0.038  1 
Biotechnology 0.237  9  0.250  3  0.231  6 







Predicting the Probability of Insurmountable IP Barriers 
                        

















                       
ATP  share  27.8  (13.2) **  25.2  (12.9) *  22.4  (12.3) *  23.7  (12.3) *  4.43 
Length  of  project  -1.59  (0.77) **  -1.40  (0.74) *  -1.57  (0.79) **  -1.24  (0.69) *  -0.23 
Prior university 
experience 
5.35  (2.80) *  4.95  (2.72) *  4.39  (2.62) *  4.81  (2.63) *  0.90 
Chemicals  4.44  (1.84) **  3.89  (1.80) **  3.77  (1.82) **  3.36  (1.70) **  0.63 
Small lead  
participant 




          
Large lead  
participant 






























Log  likelihood  -9.67    -9.17    -7.80    -8.49     
Pseudo  r-squared  0.673    0.663    0.668    0.627     
Chi-squared for      




   23.0 
(.000) 
   19.0 
(.004) 
   17.6 
(.001) 
    
                        
Notes to the table:                      
Coefficient estimates are from the cumulative normal probability that partnering encountered insurmountable IP barriers. 
Standard error estimates are shown in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%,5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
  
Specification (2) omits 7 observations where the lead participant is non-profit because for these observations the absence of IP barriers is predicted perfectly. 
Specifications (3) and (4) omit 6 additional observations for joint ventures with university partners; these observations also predict the absence of barriers 
perfectly. All of the non-profit participants are also joint ventures with university partners. 
In specification (4), the average (over the sample) derivative of the probability with respect to the variable is shown in the last column. 







Probability of Insurmountable IP Barriers by Type of Research 
Results 
      
    Research Results  
   Appropriable  Inappropriable   
    (low ATP share)  (high ATP share) 
       















       















      
Notes to the table:    
These predicted probabilities are based on the estimates in specification (4) of Table 3, for projects in 
industries other than chemicals. The variables for ATP share and the length of the project have been set to 
their mean +/- one standard deviation. 
Being a non-profit lead participant or a joint venture with a university participant predicts the lack of IP 
barriers perfectly. These observations have not been used for the predictions in this table, which is based 
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91010016  Ultra-High Density Magnetic Recording Heads 
91010134  Hybrid Superconducting Digital System 
92010040  Engineering Design with Injection-Molded Thermoplastics 
92010044  Genosensor Technology Development 
93010079  Flip Chip Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit (MMIC) Manufacturing Technology 
94010079  Engineered Surfaces for Rolling and Sliding Contacts 
94010135  Enhanced Molecular Dynamics Simulation Technology for Biotechnology Applications 
94010178  Rapid Agile Metrology for Manufacturing 
94010228  Computer-Integrated Revision Total Hip Replacement Surgery 
94010282  Diamond Diode Field Emission Display Process Technology Development 
94010305  Film Technologies to Replace Paint on Aircraft 
94020032  Composite Production Risers 
94020039  Low-Cost Advanced Composite Process for Light Transit Vehicle Manufacturing 
94020040  Development of Manufacturing Methodologies for Vehicle Composite Frames 
94020043  Low Cost Manufacturing and Design/Sensor Technologies for Seismic Upgrade of Bridge 
Columns 
94020048  Manufacturing Composite Structures for the Offshore Oil Industry 
94040017  Automated Care Plans and Practice Guidelines 
94050006  Development of Rapid DNA Medical Diagnostics 
94050027  Integrated Microfabricated DNA Analysis Device for Diagnosis of Complex Genetic Disorders 
94050030  Diagnostic Laser Desorption Mass Spectrometry Detection of Multiplex Electrophore Tagged 
DNA 
94050033  Automated DNA Amplification and Fragment Size Analysis 
95010126  Technology Development for the Smart Display - A Versatile High-Performance Video Display  
Integrated with Electronics 
95010150  Development of Closed Cycle Air Refrigeration Technology for Refrigeration Markets 
95020008  Agile Precision Sheet-Metal Stamping 
95020026  Flexible Low-Cost Laser Machining for Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 
95020036  Plasma-Based Processing of Lightweight Materials for Motor-Vehicle Components and 
Manufacturing  Applications 
95020062  Fast, Volumetric X-Ray Scanner for Three-Dimensional Characterization of Critical Objects 
95030018  High-Performance, Variable-Data-Rate, Multimedia Magnetic Tape Recorder 
95030022  Technology Development for Optical-Tape-Based Rapid Access Affordable Mass Storage 
(TRAAMS) 
95040027  Advanced Distributed Video ATM Network for Creation, Editing, and Distribution 
95050007  Continuous Biocatalytic Systems for the Production of Chemicals from Renewable Resources 
95050040 Breakthrough Technology for Oxidation of Alkanes 
95080006  Real-Time Micro-PCR Analysis System 
95080017  DNA Diagnostics Using Self-Detected Target-Cycling Reaction (SD-TCR) 
95100019  Healthcare Information Technology Enabling Community Care 
95120015  Model-Driven Application & Integration Components for MES 
95120027  Advanced Process Control Framework Initiative 
96010172  A Portable Genetic Analysis System 
 
Notes to the Table:   
A description of each project is available at: http://jazz.nist.gov/atpcf/prjbriefs/listmaker.cfm 